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Where are the Pots and Pans? Collective
Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization
in a Time of Crisis: Learning from Latin
America
BARRY CANNON & MARY P. MURPHY
Department of Sociology, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Ireland
ABSTRACT Since 2008, Ireland has experienced a profound multi-faceted crisis, stemming
from the collapse of the financial and property sectors. Despite enduring six years of neoliberal
austerity measures in response to this situation, popular protest has been muted. Using Silva’s
[(2009) Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press)] framework of analysis of popular responses in Latin America to that
region’s debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, this article seeks to investigate why this has
been the case. We assess how the crisis is being framed among popular and civil society
groups, and whether increased associational and collective power is developing. In doing
so, we look at processes of intra-group cooperation, cross-group cooperation and framing
and brokerage mechanisms. We then ask, where such processes exist, if they can lead to a com-
prehensive challenge to the neoliberal policies currently being implemented, as happened in
much of Latin America. We conclude that the crisis has not yet reached sufficient depth or long-
evity to foster a more robust popular response, but propose that analysis of similar processes
in Latin America can help us understand better why this is the case, not just in Ireland, but in
other countries of Europe experiencing similar situations.
Introduction: Collective Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization in a Time
of Crisis: Where are the Pots and Pans?
Since the global financial crisis began in 2008, Ireland has been undergoing unprece-
dented economic and social crises and austerity measures. Neoliberal adjustments
have been implemented by two successive governments. Yet, despite the severity
of the crisis and the scale of adjustment, Irish popular reaction has primarily been
electoral in nature, with little in the way of sustained mass protest or street campaigns,
unlike more lively responses in other European countries suffering similar crises and
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austerity programmes, such as Greece and Spain. In this article, we seek to shed light
on this conundrum by using Silva’s (2009) analysis of Latin America during that
region’s debt crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, as a framework to understand better Ire-
land’s present situation.
Like Ireland and many European countries today, Latin America was also beset by
economic crisis in the early 1980s. Public debt resulted in similar neoliberal adjust-
ment measures being implemented throughout the region. State services and social
provision were drastically cut back, while debt repayment was prioritized, and
state-owned companies in key sectors, including telecommunications, energy,
mining, water and other areas were privatized and often sold to foreign investors.
This resulted in more precarious labour conditions, higher unemployment, increased
poverty and inequality, higher prices for basic utilities, and increased concentration of
income and capital.
Argentina was the most paradigmatic case of them all, swiftly moving in 2001
from ‘poster child’ status for neoliberalism in the region to become ‘the Ethiopia
of Latin America’ (Kirby, 2003: 202). By the end of 2002, the country’s economy
was reduced to practically half its 1998 size, incomes were also halved and over
50 per cent of the population slid below the poverty line (Kirby, 2003: 202).
While Argentina’s story is certainly the most dramatic of the time, other countries,
such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, experienced similar declines. However,
unlike in Ireland, in these countries crises eventually led to mass popular uprisings
and a ‘pink tide’ of left- and left-of-centre governments being installed throughout
much of the region (Silva, 2009).
How did such a massive shift take place in Latin America and what lessons in that
experience are there for Ireland or other European countries experiencing similar
processes of neoliberalization? In this article, we use Silva’s (2009) framework of
analysis of popular responses to neoliberalism in Latin America to help answer
this question. Silva (2009) offers a multi-dimensional framework, drawn from Pola-
nyi’s (2001 [1944]) theory of the double movement, which identifies associational
power (intra-group cooperation), collective power (cross-group cooperation) and
ideological power (framing and brokerage mechanisms) as key concepts to help
explain successful popular mobilization against neoliberalism in Latin America.
We use this framework to assess the extent to which such processes are taking
place among popular sectors and civil society groups in Ireland, how crisis is
being framed among those groups and whether increased associational and collective
power is capable of posing a popular challenge to the neoliberal policies currently
being implemented.
In adopting Silva’s inquiry into the Latin American experience as a springboard,
we are cognizant of important differences between the reality of Latin America
and Ireland, not least that Ireland is a developed country and within the European
Union (EU). However, we believe the conjunctural situation of neoliberal austerity
is sufficiently similar and Silva’s framework sufficiently flexible to make such a com-
parison worthwhile. We also believe that the framework is a useful comparative
mechanism for other European societies implementing fiscal retrenchment policies.
2 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [M
ay
no
oth
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
9:0
1 0
7 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
7 
The article first identifies the key theoretical themes in Silva’s work that are appli-
cable to the Irish case. This involves identifying sufficient motivation for a double
movement to occur, including the imposition of market society, leading to economic
crisis and causing stark socio-economic inequalities. The article then examines
Silva’s concept of capacity among popular forces to force change away from neolib-
eral precepts. It applies these concepts to the Irish situation, assessing to what extent
motivation and capacity exist in Irish society to provoke a successful double move-
ment type reaction against market society construction. It concludes by reflecting on
the original question – why there has not been concerted resistance to neoliberalism
in the current context of crisis.
Five Conditions for Popular Organization against Neoliberalism
Silva, in his examination of challenges to neoliberalism in Latin America, takes Karl
Polanyi’s theory of the ‘double movement’ as his starting point. Briefly, Polanyi
argued in The Great Transformation (2001 [1944]) that during the ‘long’ nineteenth
century the principal world (i.e. European plus the United States) powers attempted to
impose ‘market society’ globally, leading to a ‘double movement’ of popular reaction
against its imposition, whereby all sorts of social and economic groups sought ‘state
support to insulate them from market forces’ (Silva, 2009: 18). Polanyi argued that
this led to ‘fascism, communism, or social democracy, passing through worldwide
economic collapse and war’ (Silva, 2009: 18).
Neoliberalism refers to a set of ideas about the relationship between the state,
market and society, which reflects Polanyi’s concept of ‘market society’. According
to Harvey (2005: 2), neoliberalism is ‘a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entre-
preneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by
strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’. It is often associated
with practices of monetarism, deregulation, privatization and tax cuts and a general
roll-back of the state and public expenditure. Ultimately, society is more commodi-
fied and dependent on the market to survive.
Silva contends that the 25 years of application of neoliberal reform in Latin
America, roughly taking place during the 1980s and 1990s, is comparable to the
imposition of market society as hypothesized by Polanyi. In Latin America, pro-
neoliberal forces – ‘political leaders, political parties, technocrats, socio-economic
elites, and sectors of the middle class’ (Harvey, 2005: 44) – all supported and
guided neoliberal reforms. Crucial too was transnational power, in the form of
expanding financial markets and multi-national companies along with powerful
multi-lateral lending agencies, mainly the IMF and the World Bank. Successive gov-
ernments, regardless of ideological background, worked with these agencies, to
develop market society and reshape the state and democracy to meet neoliberal objec-
tives. To do this, many governments used decree powers, bypassing their own parties
or party coalitions, often relying on small, closed technocratic teams for policy
formulation.
Collective Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization 3
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In response to these measures, in almost all cases organized labour spearheaded
resistance, yet this was quashed due to its structural weakening in terms of bargaining
power, depleting memberships, reduced influence with political parties, manipulation
by and collusion with neoliberal forces, and state repression. New unions emerged in
Brazil and to a lesser extent inUruguay but elsewhere established unions remainedmar-
ginal. This vacuumat theheart of popular organizingmeant that popular power had to be
re-founded by rebuilding associational power (creating new organizations and recast-
ing existing ones) and forging collective power (coalition building). ‘This permitted the
mobilization of large numbers of people (masses) to exercise disruptive economic
power’ (Silva, 2009: 46), leading eventually to the breaking up of neoliberal coalitions,
the overthrow of neoliberal governments and their replacement with ‘governments
committed to reforming contemporary market society’ (Silva, 2009: 46).
Silva (2009: 46) identifies ‘five necessary conditions’ to create such a dynamic.
First, citizens must feel economically and politically excluded; second, there must
be a democratic setting to allow collective action and protest to take place; third, neo-
liberalism must be identified in the popular imagination as the key cause of people’s
sense of exclusion, and different mechanisms such as brokerage to help organize and
form anti-neoliberal alliances are the means to achieve this; fourth, such mobilization
must be reformist and non-violent in nature and, fifth, the overall context is one of
poor economic performance, if not outright economic crisis, both nationally and
internationally. We will return to these conditions in more detail below.
In Latin America, popular power developed through organization among those
groupsmost affected by austeritymeasures: the unemployed, the underemployed, pen-
sioners, territorial organizations (such as neighbourhood organizations), agricultural
workers and smallholders, indigenous groups and even within the military. State
responses to such mobilization were also important in the formation of such organiz-
ation. Co-optation helped weaken it, dividing the different groups and so lessening the
impact of popular responses. However, often the promises inherent in co-optation of
increased social and political inclusion were betrayed, leading to furious popular
counter-reaction, met in turn by state repression and continued exclusion, which ulti-
mately led in some cases to outright rebellion. Issue framing was crucial in knitting
together the myriad groups, connecting ‘personal problems and those of social
groups, to the economic and political exclusion generated by the construction of
market society’ (Silva, 2009: 50). The central theme of such framing had its roots in the
will of domestic and international political and economic elites to exploit and
dominate the popular sectors, which robbed them of the necessary conditions
for life (meaning the protection of individuals from the market in the interest
of improving livelihood) . . . .Therefore all had an interest in economic nation-
alism and instruments of decommodification in order to rebuild the conditions
necessary for life for all. (Silva, 2009: 50)
This reading of the situation, and the enormity of the social forces ranged against
them, underlined the necessity for a ‘common front’ between disparate groups.
4 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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Such alliances were built, according to Silva (2009), through four common broker-
age mechanisms: summit meetings and the formation of umbrella organizations to
build coalitions; overlapping membership and activity of leaders in different organ-
izational networks facilitating communication; open, general assembly-style delib-
erations for decision-making ensuring transparency and participation; and use of
communal or ancestral customs to encourage mobilization, especially among indi-
genous people. The repertoire of contention included strikes and, of these, public
sector strikes were most effective. However, with unions less powerful, actions
like strikes at the point of production had less force, and were increasingly replaced
by a focus on exchange or action at the point of consumption. This led to widespread
use of roadblocks, as these ‘disrupt commerce, therefore generating economic loss’
(Silva, 2009: 51), sometimes threatening city supplies. Mass demonstrations were
also favoured actions, as these disrupted state business, as were intercity marches.
The mass banging of pots and pans – so called cacerolazos – was particularly impor-
tant in middle-class areas. In some countries, mass rioting and looting broke out. As a
whole, Silva contends, this ‘concatenation of forms of struggle wrought by the frag-
mentation inherent in globalization may well be the contemporary replacement for the
general strike of yesteryear’ (Silva, 2009: 274).
These activities – of forging associational power, brokerage and protest – pressed
forward in waves, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, at each new economic crisis.
Most countries had, at different times, intense bursts of growth followed by deep
busts. The lack of improved conditions for the majorities prejudiced popular accep-
tance of neoliberalism as did neoliberal measures that invariably followed busts. As
time went by, more individuals, families and groups were affected negatively by neo-
liberal measures, building the case for a change of course. Yet governments rejected
popular involvement in the solution of these crises, while extracting ever higher costs
from society, resulting in fresh waves of protest. In time this had a political impact,
leading to rebellions in congress and among party ranks, and political support for the
neoliberal project began to dissolve. Repression meanwhile only added more fuel to
the fire. New parties emerged, or old parties fractured between pro- and anti-
neoliberal factions, with voters deserting pro-neoliberal camps. The result was the
eventual ouster of pro-neoliberal governments in Venezuela (1998), Argentina
(2003), Bolivia (2006) and Ecuador (2007), among others.
Silva’s analysis of anti-neoliberal challenges in Latin America provides sufficient
commonalities and similarities to justify utilizing such a framework to examine the
situation of crisis in Ireland. Ireland, along with many other European countries, is
currently implementing austerity policies, which are being imposed (increased neoli-
beralization), under the same pretext (the reduction of debt) by similar agents (mostly
centre-right, but some centre-left, governments, encouraged and supported by trans-
national institutional actors such as the European Commission (EC), the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF). Similar social impacts are evident with rises in
unemployment, underemployment, poverty and inequality, and consistently low
growth patterns. And similar popular responses are developing in similar patterns
Collective Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization 5
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– increased trade union activity in some states, including strikes, and increased
popular organization, sometimes resulting in state repression.
This framework can be effected by using the five conditions identified by Silva
(2009) and outlined above to establish if the conditions exist within Ireland (or
another country in a similar situation) to indicate the possible emergence of anti-neo-
liberal contention. These five conditions can be divided into two main types; estab-
lishing, first, if the motivations are present to provoke such a popular reaction and,
second, if the capacity exists to ensure its success in reversing neoliberalism. With
regard to motivation, we need first to ask if Ireland is experiencing a ‘long-term
market society project’, which can be done by looking for a range of state reforms
favouring the market over society and social protection. This is accompanied by an
assessment of the extent of political and socio-economic exclusion being created
by such a project, and if this is sufficient to cause a corresponding ‘double movement’
in Irish society, measured by increases in unemployment, poverty and inequality. It
can also be identified through evidence of measures to restrict popular and political
influence over economic decision-making. Second, we need to ascertain the existence
and extent of economic volatility and crisis, thus assessing the likelihood of waves of
contention to occur. Indicators of this are wide swings in GDP, government deficits
and declines in popular confidence in politics and political institutionality. The third
condition is evident through the existence of party competition and elections. With
regard to capacity, we need to identify a fourth factor in the existence of different
protest groups resulting from this situation of crisis and assess the nature of change
that they are advocating. Finally, and most importantly, we need to identify if
framing and brokerage mechanisms are being used to build a common front and if
so if these are effective. From these points, we may be able to assess the existence,
nature, extent and potential of anti-neoliberal contentious politics in the country.
These conditions and their corresponding indicators are identified in more detail in
Table 1 and will be used to guide the ensuing discussion with regard to the Irish case.
Motivation for Popular Response in Ireland
This section examines whether there is sufficient motivation for a ‘double movement’
to emerge against increased neoliberal marketization in Ireland. To do this, it explores
whether Ireland is a ‘long-term market society project’ with stark political and socio-
economic exclusion and with significant economic volatility and crisis.
Ireland as a ‘Long-term Market Society Project’
Ireland fulfils many, if not most, of the indicators associated with a ‘long-term market
society project’. Dellepiane and Hardiman (2012b: 11) assert that from the late 1980s
onwards ‘a low-tax, service-poor equilibrium began to become embedded in Irish
political economy as the engine of growth and employment creation’. The financial
crisis of 2008 led to a continuation and intensification of these policies. In the 2010
Memorandum of Understanding to the ‘troika’ of lenders to Ireland (the IMF, the EC
6 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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and the ECB), the Irish government, led then by Fianna Fa´il, agreed to ‘ . . . promote
service sector growth through vigorous action to remove remaining restrictions on
trade and competition, and . . . propose amendments to legislation to enable the impo-
sition of financial and other sanctions in civil law cases relating to competition’ (IMF,
2010: 8–9) as well as opening up ‘sheltered’ legal, medical and pharmacy sectors
(IMF, 2010: 27–28).
Furthermore, in meeting deficit targets government elected to have a ratio of 2:1 in
favour of cuts instead of tax increases. Total cuts planned for the period 2008–2015
would amount to 20 per cent of GDP, including just for the period 2009–2013, a 14
Table 1. Five factors explaining popular organization against neoliberalism
Type Factors Indicators
Motivation Long-term market society project
creating stark political and
economic exclusion
† Fiscal reforms liberalization,
privatization, welfare reforms, expansion
of institutional capacity of finance
ministers and central banks reforms to
remove economic policy for political
change
† Economic exclusion, for example,
increased unemployment, informality
and underemployment, inequality and
poverty, with lower incomes
† Political exclusion, reduced space for
expression of popular demands,
strengthened executive power at expense
of legislature, consensus among major
parties in favour of neoliberal reform,
betrayal of election and other promises
by political parties
Motivation Economic volatility and crisis † Economic growth rates to identify sharp
downturns, gross debt to GDP ratios and
government deficits, polls on lack of
confidence expressed in government
Capacity Associational political space † Existence of a democratic system of
governance
Capacity Constructing associational power
and forging collective power
† Creating new organizations and recasting
exiting ones
† Coalition building across traditional
movement organizations and across
clusters of power
† Issue framing and brokerage mechanism
to link protest groups
Capacity Reformist thrust to major protest
groups
†Advocacy for reform of neoliberalism not
the replacement of capitalism
Source: Adapted from Silva (2009, Table 3.1: 48–49).
Collective Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization 7
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per cent cut in public wages, 8 per cent cut in working age welfare rates and over 50
per cent cuts for the young unemployed, 17 per cent cut in non-pay current budget
and a 63 per cent cut in the capital budget (Caritas Europa, 2012: 23). Hence, ‘the
profile of the Irish fiscal policy response to the economic crisis since 2008 has
been quite consistently “orthodox” . . . the Irish government has displayed a steady
commitment to the politics of fiscal retrenchment’ (Dellepiane & Hardiman,
2012a: 9). Government commitments to the ‘troika’ also have led to increased com-
modification of previously protected areas, for example, the introduction of water
charging and the privatization of state-owned electricity and gas companies (IMF,
2010: 9, 30). Labour reforms focused on action to ‘facilitate re-adjustment in the
labour market’ and reforming the ‘benefits system’ to ‘create greater incentives to
take up employment’ (IMF, 2010: 9).
Socio-economic and Political Exclusion
Public expenditure cuts have impacted negatively in terms of socio-economic exclu-
sion and cuts in public spending have been significant. Even in the context of high
emigration, Ireland has seen a rise in unemployment (6.4 per cent in 2008 to
nearly 15 per cent in 2012), with 60 per cent of those long-term unemployed (over
one year) in 2012 and youth unemployment at 27 per cent (Caritas, 2012: 61);
lower average annual disposable income (from E24,380 to E20,856 between 2008
and 2012) (CSO, 2014); increased consistent poverty (4.2 per cent in 2008 to 7.7
per cent in 2012) (CSO, 2014), higher inequality (30.7 on the Gini coefficient
measure in 2008 to 31.2 in 2012) (CSO, 2014) and worsened income distribution
(4.6 in 2008 to 5.0 of income quintile in 2012) (CSO, 2014). As the crisis goes on,
the cumulative impact of austerity may deepen and so the pressure on the growing
cost of social transfers may become more and more difficult to sustain. Deprivation
rates measuring enforced lack of two or more essential items have risen from 11.8 per
cent in 2007 to 26.9 per cent in 2012 (CSO, 2014) and people are coping with extra
charges including a 2013 property tax and a 2015 domestic water charge.
Irish labour unit costs fell by 12.2 per cent during the same period (2008–2012)
due to the imposition of wage cuts (especially in the public sector) and an increase
of Irish labour productivity (Erne, 2013). There is variable experience in the
private sector. While many workers lost jobs and saw reduced income and reduced
hours lost, some sectors experienced wage increases, a cut in the minimum wage
effected by the previous government was restored, the Universal Social Charge
thresholds were made less regressive and direct income taxes were not increased
after 2011. All these measures have softened the blow in terms of loss of earning
power for many in the private sector. Similarly, adult (over 25) social welfare pay-
ments remain frozen at 2011 rates and social welfare pensions remain protected.
Moreover, although unemployment is high, it has not reached levels found in
similar crisis countries such as Greece or Spain, and is declining, with figures
below 12 per cent by early 2014. So while many are suffering real hardship and depri-
vation, it cannot be said that Ireland’s current, post-crisis levels of socio-economic
8 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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exclusion are ‘stark’ or that rates of poverty and inequality have sky rocketed since
the crisis.
A number of measures taken by government have had the effect of isolating econ-
omic policy from democratic influence. The conditional loan arrangement with the
‘troika’ assured isolation from democratic oversight and severely constrained dom-
estic budgetary discretion as ‘all budget decisions must be cleared with the troika,
fiscal performance is subject to quarterly reviews and troika personnel are embedded
in the core government departments’ (Hardiman & Regan, 2012: 9). The 2011 Euro-
pean Fiscal Compact Treaty Referendum locks Ireland into fulfilling strict fiscal
targets set by the EC. A new state agency, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, was
established in July 2011 to independently assess, and comment publicly on
whether the Government is meeting these fiscal targets. A new ministry for Public
Expenditure and Reform (PER) was also created to drive through cuts in the
public service and power is further centralized in a new Cabinet Sub-Committee,
the Economic Management Council comprising the top echelons of government:
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), the Ta´naiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister
for Foreign Affairs and Trade (currently a combined portfolio), the Minister for
Finance, and the Minister for PER – in other words the top echelons of the govern-
ment with an emphasis on the economic and the fiscal. Meeting weekly, it ‘makes
decisions on everything important’ for the country ‘and is, in effect, the core of the
Government’ (Kinsella, 2013), further isolating economic decision-making from
popular scrutiny and reinforcing a sense of political exclusion.
Forms of political exclusion have also become more widespread in civil society. In
the past, civil society, including trade unions and relevant NGOs influenced socio-
economic policy through the Social Partnership arrangements These, however,
ended rather abruptly in 2008 and civil society had little input into the State’s
National Recovery Plan for 2011–2014.1 Hence, there was ‘a clear lack of popular
participation in both the design and implementation of crisis response measures’
(Holland, 2012: 11). A variety of state agencies charged with ensuring equality
and monitoring poverty were closed or downgraded in state-rationalization pro-
grammes. The Human Rights Commission and the Equality Authority were down-
graded, while the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism
was closed down and the Combat Poverty Agency was integrated into the Department
of Social Affairs (Holland, 2012: 16).
Government action became less accountable to the public as it sought to expedite
reform. Hardiman (2012: 11–12) points to the fact that the Minister for Finance in
the Irish political system traditionally has wide autonomy of action, and this was
most forcefully used in his institution of the bank guarantee in September 2008,
which safeguarded all assets of Irish-based banks. The Anglo-Irish Bank was nationa-
lized through emergency legislation in 2009 (Hardiman, 2012: 7) and from 2011 to
September 2013, a parliamentary guillotine process was used to pass 55 per cent of
legislation (McDowell, 2013). Public trust in the State’s public and private institutions
has collapsed as a resultwith theEdelmanTrust Index,measuring average public trust in
the fourmain groups of institutions – business, government, NGOs andmedia – placed
Collective Responses in Ireland to Neoliberalization 9
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Ireland as the third least trusting country of the 27 European countries surveyed
(Edelman, 2014).
Economic Volatility and Crisis
Since the onset of the crisis, Ireland has gone from very high rates of growth to deep
negative rates and after some recovery, relative stagnation. Hence growth in 2007 was
at 5.4 per cent of GDP, plunging to 25.5 per cent in 2009, to recover somewhat to 1.6
per cent in 2011 (Caritas Europa, 2012: 23, Table 5). Meanwhile, the gross debt to
GDP ratio ballooned from 24.8 to 106.4 per cent between 2007 and 2011, with the
government deficit going from 0.1 to 13.4 per cent of GDP in the same period.
Table 2 shows the Irish economic crisis relative to other EU crisis states and how
Irish volatility did not always reach Greek or even Spanish levels:
To conclude this section Ireland displays many of the indicators that satisfy Silva’s
conditions for a ‘double movement’ to occur. There is convincing evidence that a
‘long-term market society project’ is taking place, from the 1980s to the 2008
crisis and right through to the present. The country has displayed economic volatility
and there is evidence of social and political exclusion. As can be seen in Table 2,
Ireland does not reach Greek or Spanish levels of economic volatility so our con-
clusion concerning levels of motivation is necessarily nuanced; conditions, while
present, are less extreme in form than in comparable countries such as Spain and
Greece, not to mention those experienced in Latin America in the 1980s and
1990s. Irish indicators, therefore, may not be sufficiently severe to provoke a deter-
mined counter-reaction from popular sectors, at least one capable of forcing a change
of course. It is safe to say then that there are still many with much to lose from a sig-
nificant change in the status quo. In sum, while there is motivation for a popular reac-
tion against marketization, it is questionable if this is sufficiently advanced to be
effective in stalling or reversing the market project. A further question, the task of
the next section, is to ask if there is sufficient capacity among popular forces to
achieve such a result.
Table 2. Economic crisis and volatility, comparing EU peripheral states
Indicators
GDP 2011–
2012
GDP peak
2012a
Unem
Sept. 2012
Real wage
2011–2012
Real wage peak
2012b
Greece 26.0 219.8 25.4 27.8 219.3
Ireland 0.4 26.4 15.1 21.2 23.4
Italy 22.3 26.7 10.8 21.4 22.9
Portugal 23.0 26.1 15.7 25.1 29.2
Spain 21.4 25.0 25.8 21.8 25.8
Source: Euromemorandum (2013).
aPeak GDP is highest of 2007 or 2008.
bPeak real wage is highest for 2007–2010.
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Capacity for Popular Response in Ireland
There is Some Motivation but is There Capacity?
How can we assess the existence, nature, extent and potential of anti-neoliberal con-
tentious politics in Ireland? In the preceding sections, we attempted to establish if
there was sufficient motivation for anti-neoliberal contention. In the following sec-
tions, we seek to establish if Irish civil society exhibits the capacity to challenge neo-
liberalism. We take the existence of ‘associational political space’ as given, as Ireland
has been a functioning liberal democracy since the foundation of the state in 1922.
However, we do need to identify if there is sufficient associational and collective
power to carry out contentious protest. To do this, we identify the different crisis-
related protest groups and assess the nature of change they are advocating. Simul-
taneously, we examine ideological power and ascertain if framing and brokerage
mechanisms are being used to build a common front and, if so, whether these are
effective. This section will, therefore, first review evidence and patterns in three
areas of organized activity in society: starting with political parties, then trade
unions and finally concentrating on social organizations. Second, with particular
regard to the latter it will then discuss framing and brokerage in an integrated
manner with associational power, separating them into distinct ideological frames,
including the largely successful framing activities of the state.
Political Capacity: Left-wing Parties
Silva identifies political activity as essential to processes of change and illustrates
how interaction of left political leaders and left civil society leaders is a crucial
element in fermenting an active associational space with capacity to shift power.
In Ireland, the 2011 general election saw broad left-wing parties and independents
massively increase their support with almost 35 per cent or a combined 62 ‘left-
wing seats’ in the 31st Da´il (comprising Labour, Sinn Fe´in, the United Left Alliance
and some left independents). Nevertheless, the centre-right Fine Gael won almost a
majority of seats, eventually going into government with the social-democratic
Labour Party, thus limiting momentum for any potential wider left alliance.
Despite widespread dissatisfaction with this coalition government, and in particu-
lar with the Labour Party, there is a sense of powerlessness among the public caused
in part by an increasing sense of betrayal on the part of political parties (O’Callaghan,
2013; Edelman, 2014). This causes difficulties not just for the more established
parties, but also the broader left. While by 2014 Sinn Fe´in was established as the
dominant left party, like the Labour Party it is also open to possible coalition with
other mainstream parties. Its past involvement in the Northern Irish ‘Troubles’ and
its contemporary record in government in Northern Ireland where it has implemented
some austerity measures may limit its ability to lead the broader left and/or translate
support into votes in primary elections. In the broader left despite some attempts at
coalition building, such as with the People before Profit and United Left Alliance,
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the left remains divided and its fragmentation acts as a significant barrier to broader
movement building.
Civil Society Capacity I: The Trade Unions
TradeUnions in Ireland have exhibited tendencies towards both protest and co-optation,
with the latter the most powerful of the two strategies. Consistent with Silva’s expec-
tations, Irish organized labour spearheaded early resistance to austerity with, for
example, a 100,000 strong show of force at a march in February 2009. There has been
some evidence, also, of allocating funds towards organizing andmobilization, cross-sec-
toral participation inwider campaigns, developingallianceswith left groups andorganiz-
ing sectoral protests by teacher and nurse unions against specific policy measures.
Nevertheless, as in Latin America, a structural weakening in terms of bargaining
power, depleting memberships, reduced influence with political parties and a proactive
state framing strategy, which implicated trade unions as a causal part of crisis, led unions
to follow a defensive strategy. This involved maintaining their corporate tradition by
entering into public sector wage agreements facilitating some policies that wider leader-
ship rhetoric, conversely, appears to resist.
Three agreements have been negotiated with government since 2010 (Croke Park I,
Croke Park II and Haddington Road), all involving elements such as pay cuts and
freezes, changes in working conditions and practices and no-strike deals in return
for guarantees against compulsory redundancies in the public service. The trade
union movement remains a source of associational, collective and ideological
power with significant levels of grassroots resistance within union membership,
and minor strategies of sectoral mobilization, inter-organizational solidarity and
cooperation, not to mention a relatively challenging anti-austerity discourse.
However, based on a strategic and tactical analysis of what was felt possible to
deliver (informed by a context of high levels of worker debt, particularly mortgage
debt) the leadership appears to have judged it not possible to mobilize sufficient
numbers of people to exercise ‘disruptive economic power’ capable of forcing
state policy away from neoliberalism (O’Connor, 2013). This defensive strategy
creates its own momentum, impacts on the trade union capacity to lead resistance,
while also opening up splits among and within trade unions.
Civil Society Capacity II: Social Organizations
What then of popular power, as in organized civil society, apart from trade unions?
Murphy (2011) and Kirby (2010) explore various cultural, historical and institutional
explanations for the nature of Irish civil society response to the crisis. Adshead and
Tonge (2009: 142) identify Ireland’s peripheral location and a conservative, peasant,
land owning and rural culture as key factors influencing the political culture of Irish
civil society. They stress how, in response to colonialism, Ireland developed a ‘reli-
gious-ethnic conceptualization of nation’ which reinforced a political culture associ-
ated not with citizenship but with authoritarianism, conformism and loyalty (Adshead
12 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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& Tonge, 2009: 147). Mair (1992) draws attention to the lack of ideological or class
divide in the historical evolution of Irish political parties and describes citizens as
passive and stagnant (Mair, 2010).
Here, mindful of such political culture and context, we focus on evidence of
increased associational space or collective power in Irish civil society and examine
which framing techniques are used. Popplewell (2013) observes that in comparison
to Greece and Spain, there has been a relative absence in Ireland of new social move-
ments or other types of civic action in response to state austerity policy. While pro-
tests have been more numerous than is often asserted, many have been small, sector
specific and often local, with little trade union involvement. It is possible, however, to
identify broad trends of creating new organizations, recasting existing ones and
coalition building across clusters of power.
Exploring formation of narratives is crucial. Following Khoo and Murphy’s (2010)
analysis of early public responses to the crisis, these experiences can be categorized
under three main tendencies; first, mainstream, state or business-led framing and
associational exercises explicitly or implicitly supportive of neoliberalism; second,
defensive, reformist and renovative associational and discourse exercises which
seek to reform the state and/or neoliberalism; and finally, anti-capitalist groups
which seek to challenge the state, capitalism as well as neoliberalism. The 2011
General Election was a key narrative opportunity in which a number of distinct con-
stituencies of interests were part of the ideological framing of the crisis; media, aca-
demics, politicians, trade union officials and left think tanks and some civil society
organizations. Across these political spectrums, debates questioned the basis of aus-
terity responses, the balance of taxation and expenditure responses to managing the
fiscal deficit, the nature of responses to sovereign debt and the role of the EU.
State and market-led exercises. We start by looking at framing activity on the part
of the state in alliance with market and transnational actors. Throughout the 2011
General Election, a general policy convergence in favour of neoliberal reform was
prevalent among the three main parties of Fianna Fa´il, Fine Gael and Labour
(Dellepiane & Hardiman, 2012a: 10), including promoting the EU Fiscal Compact
Treaty in a 2012 Referendum. Public sector and welfare recipients, trade unions
and civil society actors were thus ‘unable to veto a strategy that was deemed to be
essential to restoring both financial credibility and business confidence’ (Dellepiane
& Hardiman, 2012a: 23) and the case for curbing public spending commitments has
acquired the status of received opinion among political, financial and media elites
(Dellepiane & Hardiman, 2012a:12, Mercille, 2014; see also Costello, 2014).
Indeed, those putting forward counter-narratives were to an extent blamed for the
crisis. This was seen in a state, market and media narrative which vilified public
sector workers and trade unions as at least partially responsible for the crisis,
pitting these against private sector, non-unionized workers. Similarly, successive
Ministers for Social Protection framed narratives about social welfare fraud that set
welfare claimants against citizens who themselves are framed as tax payers and
further divided as ‘deserving’ and ‘non deserving’ welfare claimants. Such framing
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exercises were paralleled by some market-led associational projects, which sought to
provide solutions to the crisis based on promoting economic activity. For example, an
early initiative Your Country, Your Call (2010) focused on the economy and called
for ‘entrepreneurial citizenship’. These projects were consistent with neoliberal
Ireland and often funded by the state in association with private philanthropy and/
or private companies.
Reformist and renovative associational and discourse exercises. In terms of associa-
tional experiences, this subgroup can best be subdivided into defensive and offensive
coalitions, as they have slightly differing discourses. On the defensive side examples
are the Equality and Rights Alliance, a campaign of 170 social organizations orga-
nized to defend and strengthen statutory equality and human rights institutions;
The Poor Can’t Pay, a civil society coalition, involving socially oriented NGOs
and trade unions and focusing on protecting minimum wages and social welfare
rates; and the Coalition to Protect the Lowest Paid made up of workers, trade
unions and community organizations who came together to defend the pay and con-
ditions of the lowest paid workers in Ireland. None of these explicitly frame their
agendas as anti-neoliberal but they do resist neoliberal austerity measures through
building coalitions (Equality and Rights Alliance), and including overlapping mem-
bership and active leadership in different organizational networks (The Poor Can’t
Pay and The Coalition to Protect the Lowest Paid).
Offensive coalitions seek to proactively reframe debate about alternatives and
more overtly contest neoliberalism. One example, Anglo: Not Our Debt formed
from cross-sectoral relationships and coalitions with the global justice community
and local community organizations and activists. It opposed the repayment of debt
accrued by Anglo-Irish Bank, a property and investment bank which contributed
most to the Irish financial crisis. Another example, Claiming Our Future, described
itself as ‘a progressive movement for an equal, sustainable and thriving Ireland’
(Murphy, 2013). Emerging in 2010 as a small group seeking to promote the discus-
sion of macro-level alternatives, its ‘Plan B’ initiative, a 2012/2013 campaign to
popularize a macro-economic alternative to austerity, focused on increased invest-
ment, higher taxation and maintenance of key public spending initiatives. This initiat-
ive involved a number of key anti-neoliberal reformist think tanks, including the
social-democratic-oriented Think Tank for Action on Social Change; the religious-
based Social Justice Ireland and the trade union funded Nevin Economic Research
Institute, all of which had some individual and collective success in framing econ-
omic debate and developing an anti-neoliberal narrative which promotes alternatives.
Cross-sectoral gender movements also engaged in coalition building with a resur-
gence of feminism and the Irish Feminist Network and their campaign for equality
proofing budgets and the reproductive rights campaigns for abortion legislation in
2013. These groups are also part of a wider developing social and economic rights
discourse, which, led by groups like Amnesty Ireland and the Irish Council
for Civil Liberties, successfully championed the Constitutional Convention
14 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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(2012–2014) to recommend the insertion of economic and social rights into the Irish
constitution.
All of these groups are to some degree impacted by various state policies that have
changed the nature of civil society (Murphy, 2011). As Popplewell (2013: 15) reflects
there are ‘clear tensions ... between the service delivery and more political functions’
of NGOs with many dominated by the state, through funding and other means, hence
limiting their ability to criticize government policy and advocate for change. Harvey
(2014) argues these features of Irish civil society have been exacerbated since the
onset of the current crisis, making it even more difficult for these organizations to
act as a catalyst for a double movement to develop. Relatively low motivation and
weak social capacity, combined with active state-market forces and collusion with
these by key civil society actors, limits even further the likelihood of its occurring.
Anti-capitalist coalition building and framing exercises. Three coalitions serve as
examples of a more radical form of coalition building. Cross-sectoral mobilization
exists in the pre-crisis Shell to Sea Campaign and the newer Anti-Fracking campaigns
as well as various attempts at bringing related movements together through Climate
Camp, Community Campaigns Gathering and Activist Fleadh (Cox, 2012).The Cam-
paign against Household and Water Taxes, a cross-sectoral alliance between the
household charge, property tax and water charges campaigns, has been the largest
Irish mobilization vehicle to date. The campaign evolved to oppose a new 2013 prop-
erty tax (which replaced the 2012 flat rate household charge) and to oppose new water
charges introduced in 2014. The campaign, with a strong IT presence, focuses on
county-level mobilization, and advocates actions such as non-payment of taxes and
charges, tactical disruption of local council meetings, more general street protest,
pickets and marches. Its wider cross-sectoral capacity is limited, however, by pro-
grammatic, strategic and political differences among heterogeneous members,
making it difficult to frame collective demands. Some collaborators, for example,
are issue-specific groups (such as septic tanks and turf cutting campaigns dominated
by private property and land rights perspectives), while others are anti-neoliberal and
anti-capitalist in analysis. Demands, then, can be framed according to the lowest
common denominator and thus positioned ambiguously in relation to neoliberalism,
capitalism and taxation. Other examples of such coalition building where it was dif-
ficult to agree and articulate demands was the Irish Occupy experience, similar to
Occupy Wall Street in New York and Occupy St Paul’s in London. Occupy used
open, general assembly-style deliberations for decision-making ensuring transpar-
ency and participation, camping in six different Irish towns and capturing some
popular support. However, like its USA and UK cousins it fizzled out when dis-
mantled in March 2012.
To sum up, in general we can find Irish evidence of brokerage mechanisms includ-
ing summit meetings and the formation of umbrella organizations to build coalitions.
Protest repertoires are limited across these different forms of cross-sectoral alliances.
Trade unions, due to their policy of cooperation with government, have embarked on
few strikes. There has been little evidence of more disruptive protest such as
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roadblocks, mass demonstrations, intercity marches, mass rioting and looting or mass
banging of pots and pans. There is, however, evidence of overlapping membership
and activity of leaders in different organizational networks facilitating communi-
cation. And there are some examples of open, general assembly-style deliberations
for decision-making ensuring transparency and participation. There is, nevertheless,
less evidence of successful strategies strengthening collective power where action
meaningfully combines groups from ‘two or more power clusters’.
To some degree this may be due to a failure of framing. A key question in Silva
(2009) is the objective of protest. In Latin America he found that most groups
aimed to reform neoliberalism, not replace capitalism. Irish experience points to
defensive rather than reformist strategies, with little evidence even of a political
project centred on macro reform of neoliberalism, never mind replacing capitalism.
The central theme in Latin America to ‘rebuild the conditions necessary for life for
all’ (Silva, 2009: 50) has been largely absent in Ireland. Indeed, we could argue
the opposite has occurred and the common sense legitimation of neoliberalism has
been reinforced over the crisis, perhaps not surprising given how well neoliberalism
was internalized in the Irish psyche pre-crisis (Garry et al., 2006). In terms of Silva’s
power analysis in Ireland, so far, the state’s coercive capacity and relative elite unity
have been maintained. A conscious state and market strategy to assure inclusion of
the ‘coping classes’ or ‘middle Ireland’ helped pull ‘the teeth from mobilizing
forces’ (Silva, 2009: 32). Those opposing have been varied in nature and rarely
anti-neoliberal in focus.
Conclusions: How Deep is Your Crisis? Prospects for a Double Movement
The main motivation behind this article was to explain the absence of large-scale
popular revolt against Irish austerity imposed as a result of the 2008 crisis. Having
explored the problem we conclude that Silva’s (2009) framework, developed to
examine response to austerity in Latin America, was useful in elucidating understand-
ing of Irish societal responses to crisis. In particular, it facilitated greater clarity on
two key points: the depth of the Irish crisis and the likely level of motivation for
protest; and the extent of and nature of Irish protest and capacity for increased
protest if the crisis is not resolved or deepens in the future. We also conclude that
the framework has potential for wider application to enable comparison with other
European crisis states and that lessons from such a European focus could offer
even deeper learning from an Irish perspective.
In examining motivation we identified a ‘long-term market society project’ in
Ireland ongoing since the 1990s. This project brought important levels of prosperity
for large swathes of the Irish population and also significant personal debt. Despite
falling property prices many people have retained some prosperity even in the
current context of crisis and so are committed to the status quo. Others, however,
are limited by significant amounts of personal debt. Furthermore, as noted above, neo-
liberalism and free market ideology have largely been internalized by Irish people.
Although faith in neoliberal institutions has been badly shaken (Edelman, 2014)
16 B. Cannon & M. P. Murphy
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progressive groups have had difficulty popularizing ideas about alternatives to auster-
ity, not helped by a largely neoliberalized mainstream media (Mercille, 2014) using
narrow, pro-market and divisive framing mechanisms (Cawley, 2011). Despite unre-
solved high levels of individual and collective indebtedness, increased deprivation
as a growing feature in the middle class2 and extensive political and socio-economic
exclusion created by economic volatility, we argue, relative to Latin America, the
crisis simply has not been grave enough to cause a ‘double movement’ with sufficient
force to provoke a change of course. Meanwhile, the power of indigenous Irish pro-
neoliberal forces augmented by their international allies, particularly in the ‘troika’
of the EC, ECB and IMF, has remained far stronger than that of contending forces.
The capacity framework draws our attention to, and makes visible, a substantial
degree of Irish protest and some very conscious attempts to build collective action
and frame narratives. This article has identified a number of the larger attempts but
there have also been countless smaller, more localized protests. Yet these have not
demonstrated the necessary capacity, alliance building and narrative framing poten-
tial to create the conditions for a double movement. Key to this phenomenon is the
decline in the traditional role of the trade unions in Irish protest building, as indeed
was the case in Latin America. These have adopted a largely defensive role, thus
restricting their capacity for narrative and alliance building with others. We also
note that a historically strong Irish civil society is now dominated by state and
market (Mair, 2010), reducing its requisite force to catalyse such a double movement
(Kirby, 2010; Murphy, 2013). As Popplewell (2013: 15) contends, ‘space for civil
society activity, how civil society should be funded in the context of declining
resources, and the ability of civil society to respond to and capitalise on windows
of opportunity produced by crisis’ are all key issues for its ability to respond to the
current situation.
In Latin America, coalition building on a national and regional basis involved the
framing of issues in clearly anti-neoliberal terms, appealing to all groups including
popular movements and middle classes. Indeed, identity-based social movements
in a number of countries, including indigenous movements, are generally recognized
as having been the main catalysts for anti-neoliberalism. As Fraser (2013) insists this
intersection between redistribution and recognition is an essential space for move-
ment building and for developing common reformist narratives. In Ireland,
however, no such ‘spearhead’ exists on a social or political basis to channel
popular demands in such an anti-neoliberal direction. This absence we have argued
seems to lie in lack of capacity as much as lack of motivation. Lack of capacity
can be explained by the nature of Irish social power and how it is organized, in par-
ticular the state and market structures which constrain and shape such agency and
their position in the wider global structure. It can also be accounted for due to
more local fragmentary and sectarian tendencies within the Irish Left and the reactive
and conservative natures of Irish NGOs. We noted a number of Irish attempts at
forging inter-organizational coalitions and unified discourses and strategies. We con-
clude these efforts will need to be continued and strengthened in the coming years if a
double movement is to emerge at all in Ireland.
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Finally, we believe that a key insight which Silva (2009) brings to the debate in
Ireland is his insistence on the need to take the long view. Silva (2009) understood
neoliberalism as assaulting in waves, resulting in counter-waves of associational
power, brokerage and protest at each new economic crisis. Despite government pro-
testations to the contrary, the crisis is still very much alive in Irish society. As noted,
debt, both collective and individual, remains at record levels, having a negative effect
on domestic demand. Moreover, unemployment, despite reductions, remains high,
and a whole host of structural adjustment policies are pending, including new
taxes and charges and privatizations of key utilities. The neoliberal waves, then,
are far from stagnant and potential for conflict will therefore remain.
Notes
1. This was drawn up by the Fianna Fa´il-led government but has been executed relatively unchanged by
the present Fine Gael/Labour coalition.
2. The CSO’s 2014 Survey Income and Living Conditions (CSO, 2014) shows that 16.5 per cent of the
population are at risk of poverty and 26.9 per cent experience two or more deprivation indicators.
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